

Doctor *honoris causa*

Matthew O. Jackson



UAB

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Doctor *honoris causa*

MATTHEW O. JACKSON

Discurs llegit
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UAB

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

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PRESENTACIÓ DE
MATTHEW O. JACKSON
PER
XAVIER VILÀ

Rector Magnífic de la UAB,
Degà de la Facultat d'Economia i Empresa,
Presidenta del Consell Social,
Autoritats acadèmiques,
Companyes i companys de la comunitat universitària,
Estudiants,
Convidats d'honor,
Senyores i senyors,

És un privilegi i un gran honor poder pronunciar aquesta *laudatio* en l'acte d'investidura com a doctor *honoris causa* per la nostra universitat del professor Matthew O. Jackson, un acadèmic la feina del qual ha transformat de manera fonamental la teoria microeconòmica, la teoria de jocs i les ciències socials.

Vull agrair al Consell de Govern de la UAB el fet d'haver aprovat aquesta iniciativa sorgida del Consell del Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, i que va ser avalada pel Consell de Centre de la Facultat d'Economia i Empresa.

Parlaré no només d'algunes —no tenim temps per a més— de les importantíssimes contribucions del Dr. Jackson a la recerca en economia, sinó també de la seva estreta vinculació amb la nostra universitat per mitjà del seu lligam amb membres (professors i estudiants) del Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica.

Durant dècades, els models econòmics van analitzar el comportament humà a través d'entorns simplificats i abstractes: o bé mitjançant mercats on els preus s'ajusten a partir de la interacció anònima dels agents, o bé mitjançant jocs estratègics aïllats entre dos o més jugadors. Tot i que aquests marcs van produir coneixements valuosos que van permetre l'avenç de la ciència econòmica, ometien un element crucial de la societat humana: la xarxa de connexions socials i econòmiques descentralitzades que uneixen els individus. Matthew O. Jackson va reconèixer aquesta escletxa fonamental. Combinant la formulació matemàtica rigorosa amb l'observació empírica, va desenvolupar els fonaments teòrics que el van fer ser àmpliament reconegut com el principal arquitecte de la recerca sobre el paper de les xarxes en l'economia i les ciències socials.

Abans de les seves contribucions, l'anàlisi de xarxes estava dividida entre sociòlegs, que emfatitzaven les propietats estructurals descriptives dels grafs, sense incentius econòmics ni motivacions o intencions de cap mena, i teòrics de grafs (matemàtics o físics estadístics), que analitzaven topologies de grafs aleatoris sense modelar la presa de decisions estratègica. El Dr. Jackson va unir aquestes disciplines formulant marcs econòmics rigorosos en els quals les estructures de xarxa emergeixen de manera endògena a partir de decisions estratègiques, i els comportaments econòmics es desenvolupen dinàmicament sobre aquestes topologies de xarxa.

D'aquesta manera, va dotar l'economia de les eines necessàries per cartografiar, quantificar i analitzar els complexos grafs que emmotllen les oportunitats econòmiques, des de les opcions per trobar feina en els mercats de treball fins als riscos sistèmics en cascada a les xarxes financeres.

Contribucions fonamentals a la teoria econòmica

Per entendre el veritable abast de l'impacte acadèmic del Dr. Jackson, resulta útil conèixer alguns trets de la seva carrera acadèmica. Després de completar els seus estudis de grau amb la màxima distinció, *summa cum laude*, a Princeton i d'obtenir el doctorat a Stanford el 1988, el Dr. Jackson va iniciar la seva carrera al departament MEDS de la Northwestern University i posteriorment es va traslladar al California Institute of Technology (Caltech).

La seva recerca inicial va abordar preguntes centrals en el disseny de mecanismes i la teoria de la implementació. Com es poden construir institucions de manera que agents que es preocupen del seu propi interès, operant amb informació privada, arribin de manera consistent a resultats socialment òptims? Les seves contribucions a la implementació bayesiana i als mecanismes de Nash no dominats van establir resultats de referència que continuen sent fonamentals per a la moderna teoria de contractes.

Alhora, es va adonar que les interaccions econòmiques estan interconnectades en el temps i en els vincles entre agents. En una sèrie de contribucions seminals, entre les quals destaca el seu article de 1996 amb Asher Wolinsky, on es van distanciar de la teoria de jocs cooperativa i no cooperativa clàssica introduint l'estabilitat per parelles (*pairwise stability*), el Dr. Jackson va establir els fonaments per a l'anàlisi del marc estratègic per a la formació de xarxes. Amb això, va proporcionar el marc matemàtic utilitzat avui dia en el camp de l'economia de xarxes.

Impacte empíric i global

Els descobriments teòrics del Dr. Jackson van acompanyats d'un compromís profund amb les aplicacions empíriques.

En economia del desenvolupament, el Dr. Jackson va col·laborar amb Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo (dos premis Nobel) i Arun Chandrasekhar per estudiar la difusió de programes de benestar social a l'Índia rural. En la seva recerca van avaluar com els programes de microfinances i els programes de salut pública es difonen a través dels grafs socials. Els autors van introduir els conceptes de centralitat de difusió (*diffusion centrality*) i *gossipness* com a mètriques estructurals per mesurar la capacitat d'un individu per difondre informació a través d'una xarxa. Les seves troballes empíriques van confirmar que seleccionar com a objectiu individus amb una alta centralitat de difusió augmenta dràsticament les taxes d'adopció generals, i van establir una connexió directa entre demostracions teòriques de grafs i avaluacions de polítiques mitjançant assaigs controlats.

Després de la crisi financera global de 2008, Jackson va adaptar l'estudi de les xarxes en economia als sistemes financers i al risc sistèmic. En un treball conjunt amb Matthew Elliott i Benjamin Golub, va construir un model de xarxes financeres. Els autors van establir que la integració financera presenta efectes de risc no monotònics: fins a un cert llindar, l'augment de les connexions amb contraparts proporciona diversificació del risc; més enllà d'aquest valor crític, la interconnectivitat actua com a conductor per a impagaments en cascada i fallides sistèmiques.

En sociologia i big data, els estudis del Dr. Jackson publicats a *Nature* van analitzar dades de vuitanta-quatre milions d'individus i van demostrar empíricament que la connectivitat social entre diferents classes socials és el determinant individual més fort de la mobilitat econòmica ascendent.

La col·laboració amb la UAB i Barcelona

Tot i que el Dr. Jackson ha estat catedràtic en institucions nord-americanes de primer nivell (les universitats Northwestern i Stanford i el California Institute of Technology), també manté connexions acadèmiques a Europa, profundament arrelades aquí mateix a Barcelona i centrades sobretot en la nostra universitat.

La relació entre Matt Jackson i la UAB representa anys de col·laboració acadèmica extraordinàriament fructífera. Al llarg de quatre dècades, s'ha anat construint una col·laboració en recerca entre el Dr. Jackson i el nostre col·lega Salvador Barberà (catedràtic emèrit del Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica). Treballant junts, Barberà i Jackson van publicar articles fonamentals sobre mecanismes de votació, regles d'intercanvi a prova d'estratègia, sistemes de majoria estables i economia política. Val la pena assenyalar que Salvador Barberà va ser el primer d'una llista molt extensa de coautors del Dr. Jackson.

Igualment significativa va ser la seva recerca amb el nostre enyorat col·lega Antoni Calvó-Armengol. Plegats —en alguna ocasió també amb Antonio Cabrales—, van publicar recerques a l'*American Economic Review* i al *Journal of Economic Theory* que van redefinir l'economia laboral. Van demostrar que la desigualtat en el mercat de treball no és simplement una funció de les habilitats individuals, sinó que també pot ser un resultat estructural dinàmic de les topologies de xarxa. Van mostrar com la informació laboral que flueix a través dels contactes socials pot generar correlació de l'ocupació entre agents connectats, dispersió salarial i desigualtat persistent.

Després de la tràgica pèrdua de Toni Calvó el 2007, El Dr. Jackson va treballar per mantenir el seu llegat. Durant deu anys, va ser president del Comitè de Selecció del Premi Internacional Calvó-Armengol en Economia, que homenatja joves economistes d'excepció d'arreu del món.

A més, els seus serveis a la comunitat de recerca en economia a Barcelona han estat exemplars: va ser president del Consell Assessor Científic de MOVE al campus de Bellaterra de la UAB durant tretze anys, i actualment és president del Consell Científic de la Barcelona School of Economics, en la qual la nostra universitat participa com a patró des de la seva fundació.

Matt Jackson ha estat des de fa molts anys un contribuent actiu i fonamental del nostre ecosistema acadèmic.

Laudatio de cloenda

A més de les seves nombroses distincions honorífiques —membre de la National Academy of Sciences, *fellow* de l'Econometric Society, president de la Game Theory Society i guardonat amb el Premi BBVA Fronteres del Coneixement i amb el Premi Jean-Jacques Laffont—, Matt Jackson és reconegut a tot arreu per la seva mentoria, la seva generositat i la seva dedicació als seus estudiants i col·legues.

Ha dirigit promocions d'estudiants de doctorat que ara ocupen càtedres a les principals universitats d'arreu del món. Ha escrit llibres de text definitius que serveixen de referència estàndard en els programes de màster i doctorat. I ha dedicat un temps valuós a construir institucions acadèmiques a Stanford, Caltech i, aquí, a la UAB i a la Barcelona School of Economics.

Matt Jackson ha demostrat que els agents econòmics no actuen aïllats. Som membres interconnectats d'una estructura social dinàmica. En analitzar l'arquitectura de les xarxes humanes, ens ha proporcionat les eines necessàries per dissenyar institucions més eficaces i polítiques econòmiques més eficients i equitatives.

Finalment, com a nota personal, vull compartir la meva experiència com a estudiant del professor Jackson durant els meus estudis doctorals a la Northwestern University. Matt Jackson no només va ser un professor excepcionalment lúcid i brillant en les seves classes; era també una persona extremament cordial i propera, genuïnament disposat a ajudar els seus estudiants.

És per tot això que tinc el plaer, l'honor i el privilegi de demanar al Rector Magnífic de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona que s'atorgui el grau de doctor *honoris causa* al professor Matthew O. Jackson.

Moltes gràcies.

DISCURS D'INVESTIDURA
DE MATTHEW O. JACKSON

THE IMPACT OF FRIENDSHIPS AND HOMOPHILY ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES: DATA AND THEORY

MATTHEW O. JACKSON¹

Lecture for the Doctorat Honoris Causa, October 2026

Abstract

Economic outcomes differ across people and vary greatly depending on where they were born. How much of the differences in people's outcomes can be explained by differences in the communities in which they are born and who their friends end up being? Do their friends matter more than other community members? Do their friends matter more than their parents? In this lecture I answer these questions with detailed data and discuss theory that helps explain why friends end up mattering so much. Data from a number of our studies show that: a person's friends matter greatly for that person's economic outcomes (more than their own parents); the influence of friends is causal—randomly change

¹ Stanford University, Santa Fe Institute, Monash University. <http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/>

a person's friends and it greatly changes that person's choices and trajectory—; and friendship patterns vary greatly by geography and help explain differences in inequality across societies. I also discuss how various network-based theories of behavior help explain why this is the case. In particular, I will discuss the contrasting forces behind, and the implications of, homophily—the tendency of people to befriend and interact with others who are similar to themselves. Homophily affects almost all aspects of human behavior and welfare that are network dependent—a person's choice of education, access to information, political allegiances and beliefs, job opportunities, and economic mobility. I also discuss how these forces feed back and can amplify each other. I close with a discussion of policy implications, including implications for how schools are structured, as well as some of the perils of social engineering. I also discuss the importance of multifaceted policies that address deep social divides in addition to financial constraints.

JEL Classification Codes: D85, D13, D63, D78, L14, O12, Z13.

Keywords: Social Networks, Homophily, Social Capital, Inequality, Mobility, Immobility, Economic Mobility, Job Referrals, Job Contacts, Social Norms, Networks, Complementarities, Peer Effects.

1. A Network of Connections to the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

My first visit to the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona was in 1989, more than thirty-five years ago. My connections to the Autònoma, and the number of times I have walked the halls here, are both numerous. In the parlance of networks, I have many strong ties to the UAB.

Those ties begin more than forty years ago, when I became an undergraduate advisee of Hugo Sonnenschein—who also received a Doctorat

Honoris Causa from the UAB, some thirty years ago. To a network scientist, this does not appear to be a coincidence. Along with Hugo's many other talents, he was an exceptional academic matchmaker. When I graduated from Princeton and embarked upon my doctoral studies at Stanford, Hugo somehow arranged for me to be the research assistant of another former student of his, Salvador Barberà, who was visiting Stanford for the 1984–85 academic year. The connection with Salvador became not only the foundation of a lifelong friendship, but also laid the groundwork for our families' friendships over many trips together, and led to a highly productive research collaboration. Salvador and I have coauthored seven publications together. Our work spans many questions, ranging from how people exchange goods in the presence of private information about their preferences, to when populations can coordinate on a successful protest or revolution, to how societies choose the rules by which they establish their constitutions and voting procedures, to name a few. The pleasure of working on these many projects has been that the conversations underlying them span Stanford, Bellaterra, Sant Cugat, Barcelona, Evanston, Pasadena, and Toulouse, to name some of the key locations. It is fitting that we co-wrote a biographical memoir of Hugo.

The many trips here have led to many other friendships, and it is great to see many of you here today. Curiously, another key connection that I have to the Autònoma was somewhat independent. Another key friendship and highly productive coauthorship relationship was that with Toni Calvó-Armengol. I met Toni in Paris when he was a graduate student working on job contact networks. Perhaps it was natural that he ended up at the UAB, reinforcing my already strong bonds to the community here.

The UAB has produced several doctoral students with whom I have had very productive research collaborations: Anna Bogomolnaia, Antonio Nicolò, and Shahir Safi. Again, the network, and introductions via Salvador, played key roles in the emergence of these collaborations.

The bonds to the UAB also include advisory roles coming through Salvador and Hugo: helping advise MOVE, chairing the Calvo-Armengol Prize Committee for many years, and following in Hugo's footsteps as the chair of the Scientific Council of the Barcelona School of Economics.

Receiving this honor from the Autònoma is made that much more special because of the strong ties that I have here—such an honor is enhanced coming from a group that I care deeply about and admire.

2. Networks and Homophily

As is clear from how connections to the UAB community have shaped my life and opportunities, networks of connections influence all our lives. Humans are not connected to each other at random. It was not by chance that I met Salvador or that I was visiting the place where Toni was getting a PhD. There are many forces that shape our social structures. These forces have consequences, not just for our social networks, but also for our choices, behaviors, and economic outcomes.

2.1. Background on Homophily

It was just over two decades ago that I began studying what I have since come to believe to be one of the most consequential aspects of human social networks. In a word, it is “homophily”, as named by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), and it refers to the fact that people tend to be friends and acquaintances with others who are similar to themselves. Homophily has been documented along a variety of different characteristics (Verbrugge, 1977; Marsden, 1988; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; Currarini, Jackson, and Pin, 2009,

2010; Jackson, 2014; Morelli, Ong, Makati, Jackson, and Zaki, 2017; Jackson, Nei, Snowberg, and Yariv, 2026).²

An example of homophily is pictured in Figure 1, which depicts a borrowing and lending network in the data set from Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013). The homophily here is by caste, broken into two broad categories of castes (there are many finer caste designations in the data). We see much higher frequencies of connections between people who are in the same caste grouping than across people from different caste groupings—roughly fifteen times higher frequency within than across groups.

In a pair of papers with Sergio Currarini and Paolo Pin Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009, 2010), we began exploring homophily in data on high school friendships to try to disentangle the extent to which homophily depended on choices versus meeting probabilities, finding evidence for both and finding that they differed across groups and schools.

In subsequent work with data from Facebook (Chetty et al., 2022b), we examined homophily on SES: socioeconomic standing based on estimations of income. This homophily on SES is what we termed “Economic Connectedness.” High economic connectedness refers to situations in which people who are below median SES have a high fraction of their friends who are above median SES. So, they are well connected in terms of having access to high-SES friends. Low economic connectedness refers to situations with high levels of homophily on SES: below-median-SES individuals have low fractions of their friends being from above median SES.

2 In a recent paper, Aybas, Jackson, and Nei (2026), we provide careful definitions of homophily and statistical tests for it. We also show how one can see homophily on some dimensions due to biases in linking probabilities on other dimensions.




Figure 1: Homophily in one of the villages from Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013). Nodes are households, and a link indicates that the pair of households report that at least one borrows kerosene and rice from the other. The round (solid fill) nodes are households that fall within the ‘scheduled castes’ and ‘scheduled tribes’—those considered for affirmative action by the Indian government—and the square (checkered fill) nodes are the remaining ‘general’ and ‘otherwise backward’ caste designations. The positioning of nodes is by a spring algorithm that groups nodes more closely together when they are linked to each other (and not based on geography, caste, or other node attributes). The frequency of links among households within one of the groups is .089, while it is .006 across groups. The data and figure are as analyzed by Jackson (2014).

We examined the sources of economic connectedness across the United States. We found that it is due to both (i) whether people of different SES are exposed to each other, and then (ii) even conditional on having exposure in some setting, biases in the rates at which friendships are formed. For example, people in the bottom half of the income distribution tend to live in neighborhoods that have a strict majority population of below-median income. Thus, for instance, a child with parents in the bottom half of the income distribution most

likely has most of their high school classmates also having parents below median in income. This means that they have low exposure to high-SES peers. Even beyond that, friendships exhibit a friending bias, so that below-median-SES individuals disproportionately friend other lower-SES peers beyond their relative frequency. For instance, even a below-median-SES student in a high school where 1/3 of peers have above-median-SES parents will have fewer than 1/3 of their friends be above median SES. So, we see homophily even beyond the local availability. Both of these sources of economic connectedness, and homophily more generally, are predictive of economic mobility, with each mattering roughly as much as the other. This becomes important because policies that address these two components are different: is it that people need more exposure to each other, or that they need to form more friendships conditional on exposure? Both are needed.

We also find that there is substantial heterogeneity in exposure, friending bias, and overall economic connectedness by region in the US, as well as across different places where people interact: neighborhoods, high schools, workplaces, colleges, religious institutions, and recreational groups. (The data are available at socialcapital.org.)

2.2. What Do We Learn from Data on the Economic Impact of Homophily and Social Capital?

Importantly, the heterogeneity in economic connectedness across different regions correlates very strongly with upward economic mobility, as we found in Chetty et al. (2022a). In particular, places that have low levels of economic connectedness also tend to have low levels of economic mobility: children of parents with below median SES have lower SES standing when they become adults (as measured by Chetty et al. (2014)). As an example, a child with low SES growing up in a city with the lowest economic connectedness expects to end up in the

bottom third of the income distribution, while a child with the same parents growing up in a city with the highest economic connectedness would end up just above the median on average.

Our recent work (Chetty et al., 2026) also shows that this relationship is causal (see also Mallah (2026)). In particular, by exploiting random fluctuations in the availability of high-SES peers across different years within the same high school, we find that students who end up with more high-SES peers at random end up with higher SES standing when they become adults and are more likely to attend a four-year university. Exposure to such random fluctuations is as close to an experiment on students' lives as one can responsibly run. Moreover, we find that it is friendships that matter: it is not just having another student with high-SES parents in a classroom that matters, but instead whether a student actually becomes friends with that student who has high-SES parents. Thus, not only is economic connectedness very highly correlated with economic outcomes, it also causes them. These friendships collectively matter more than one's own parent's SES.

A natural question arises as to whether this sort of homophily on economic characteristics also matters in places beyond the United States. We explored data in 46 different communities from around the globe in Power et al. (2026). These communities are mostly small and rural, relatively poor and isolated. So, they are very different from the US Facebook data in terms of GDP, market structure, integration into the global economy, and other characteristics. There, we find a strong correlation between a community's level of economic connectedness and its wealth inequality. Places that have lower levels of economic connectedness have much higher levels of inequality.³ This means that the role

3 Johnston et al. (2026) provides a look at Facebook data from around the world, again with similar findings relating economic connectedness and economic mobility. Harris et al. (2026) explore the UK in depth, with further evidence as well.

of economic connectedness seems to be a deep social phenomenon and not something that is just due to some aspect of high-GDP economies.

3. Job Contact Networks, Learning, Complementarities

Another important thing we found in the Facebook data (Chetty et al., 2022a) was that it is not only that economic connectedness is highly predictive of economic mobility, but also that other forms of social capital are not. In the parlance of Putnam (1995), economic connectedness is a form of bridging capital: it connects people across different economic classes.⁴ This contrasts with what he calls bonding capital: tightly clustered networks that can be useful for sustaining cooperative behavior (Coleman, 1988; Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan, 2012), or for maintaining strong civic organizations. It is not that these other forms of social capital are inconsequential in people's lives; it is simply that these forms of social capital do not seem to help children from relatively poor households end up earning much higher incomes than their parents.

So why should we expect economic homophily to matter? The key is to break this into two steps: First, which sorts of human behaviors and outcomes are heavily network dependent? And then, second, how does homophily impact that dependency?

A few key ways in which networks affect behavior and social and economic outcomes can be partitioned into the following three broad categories:

⁴ Interestingly, we do not find differences in strong versus weak friendships (measured by amount of interaction). From Granovetter (1973), one might expect weak ties to be the most bridging and most impactful. We do not find such an effect. It could be that it is the pure bridging aspect of ties (Jahani et al., 2023) that matters rather than its strength.

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- Opportunities: many opportunities, such as job interviews, flow through social connections.
 - Information: people's information and beliefs are heavily influenced by what they hear via their social connections.
 - Norms of Behavior: many behaviors involve complementarities with friends, neighbors, and co-workers (e.g., using the same technology, speaking the same language, etc.), and there are a variety of pressures to behave similarly to friends.

Let us take each of these in turn.

The role of networks in conveying information about job opportunities has been extensively documented (Myers and Shultz, 1951; Rees, 1966; Rees, Shultz et al., 1970; Granovetter, 1973; Montgomery, 1991; Granovetter, 1995; Ioannides and Datcher-Loury, 2004; Topa, 2011; Rubineau and Fernandez, 2013; Zeltzer, 2020). As I overview in Jackson (2026), there are many reasons for the importance of networked referrals in filling jobs, including the fact that people found via referrals tend to be more productive, more creative, and more likely to remain in their positions than people hired without referrals.⁵ Part of this is that people know their friends and can help employers discern the best matches. Another aspect is that employers wish to hire people similar to their current employees, and so homophily in the network is actually helpful. Another is that having friends at a job can affect a person's performance (Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore, 2000; Fiorillo and Nappo, 2014; Brown, Setren, and Topa, 2012).

The key reason that homophily then impacts employment and outcomes can be understood from the fact that networked referrals correlate

⁵ E.g., see Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore (2000); Brown, Setren, and Topa (2012); Fernandez and Galperin (2014); Burks, Cowgill, Hoffman, and Housman (2015); Dustmann, Glitz, Schönberg, and Brücker (2016); Pallais and Sands (2016); Bond and Fernandez (2019); Benson, Board, and Meyerter Vehn (2019).

friends' employment. As we studied in Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2007), having more employed friends, and friends of friends, leads a person to have a greater chance of getting referrals. This leads to a positive correlation in the employment (and wages) throughout a social network.⁶

When one couples this network correlation in employment and wages with homophily, especially along SES lines, someone whose friends are well employed is more likely to be well employed. This gives a simple and powerful mechanism via which economic connectedness matters.⁷

It is worth noting that this then has repercussions. If a high school student realizes that they have low prospects for connections to high-paying jobs, they have less incentive to invest in education (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Jackson, 2007; Bowles, Loury, and Sethi, 2014; Bolte, Immorlica, and Jackson, 2026). The employment prospects of friends also then affect network formation (Calvo-Armengol, 2004; Galeotti and Merlino, 2014) and career choices (Buhai and van der Leij, 2023), which then further correlate outcomes across groups.

Homophily has consequences not just in job contact networks, but also in how people learn and what beliefs they hold. Intuitively, if people share information and opinions, and update based on what they hear from their friends, then it can be that different parts of a network hold very different opinions for long periods of time, as we studied in Golub and Jackson (2010, 2012). When coupled with homophily, this means that people from different groups can have different access to information and end up with different opinions and beliefs.

⁶ For evidence, see Sacerdote (2001); Munshi (2003); Beaman (2012); Pattacchini and Zenou (2012); Laschever (2013); Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore (2015); Beaman, Keleher, and Magruder (2016); Lalanne and Seabright (2016).

⁷ For more detailed discussion of the impact of homophily on job networks, employment, wages, and productivity, see Jackson (2026).

There are also feedback effects in learning. In a homophilous network, someone may have no connections to anyone who has tried a certain thing, like going to university or entering a particular profession. This can then lead to feedback, as outlined by Aybas and Jackson (2026): not having any friends who have succeeded at a certain endeavor leads people within a group never to try that endeavor, which then locks them out from learning about it. Similar to the case of job contact networks, we see further feedbacks, as people in certain groups that lack economic connectedness then invest less in valuable skills and miss out on other opportunities, which then leads to a higher likelihood that their friends also miss out.

This last point, concerning the network feedback effects on investment, relates to the important role of homophily in determining norms of behavior (e.g., see Jackson (2007)). For example, we document causal evidence of a student's choice of which side to support in a civil war based on the allegiances of their peers (Guo, Jackson, and Jia, 2026).⁸

As an example, suppose that people choose to drop out of school if a majority of their friends do. Then if a network splits into two groups such that each member of a group has a majority of their friends within that same group, it is an equilibrium for everyone in one group to drop out and for no one in the other group to drop out. This then ties back to our earlier discussion of networks and job referrals—whether people choose to acquire skills in a given area and invest in a given profession can be influenced by what others in their network are doing. The impact of splits in a network on the emergence of different behaviors is something that we analyze at length in Jackson and Storms (2026); Jackson (2019).⁹

8 For more background on peer-influenced behaviors, see Jackson and Zenou (2014).

9 Beyond the impact of friends' choices, friends may also choose to delibe-

Taken together, these various mechanisms all work in the direction of the evidence that we saw above: communities with less economic connectedness and bigger divides between high- and low-SES individuals are more likely to see different outcomes across these groups. This translates not only into inequality, but also into a lack of mobility for the relatively lower-SES group.

4. Multifaceted Networks and Policies

The theory and data are in line, in that we see homophily, and economic connectedness in particular, determining (causing) people's trajectories. This has a number of policy implications.

Before addressing these, it is important to note that homophily has a number of positive effects as well. For example, it can be easier to learn from someone who is similar (Kets and Sandroni, 2019; Aybas and Jackson, 2026). Cooperation and coordination can also be easier to sustain among similar people. We also see that learning may be enhanced with same-gender connections (e.g., all-female study partnerships improve GPA significantly, as found in Jackson, Nei, Snowberg, and Yariv (2026), and can have other effects (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011)). This means that a policy goal should not simply be to rearrange networks to lead to a complete absence of homophily or to complete economic connectedness. Furthermore, we have seen that changes in social networks that benefit one group can harm another (Banerjee et al., 2024). These observations are indicative of the fact that social connections also serve many different purposes (Atkisson et al., 2020; Chandrasekhar et al., 2026). Thus, social en-

ately pressure others to take certain actions (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu and Jackson, 2014; Jimenez-Gomez, 2021).

gineering has to account for the fact that there are many purposes to different types of relationships, that they interact, and that they can have countervailing effects.

Nonetheless, the data on economic connectedness and economic mobility support the conclusion that an absence of cross-SES connections impedes the economic mobility of low-SES children. Moreover, cross-class connections are beneficial for economic mobility on net: adding cross-class connections benefits low-SES individuals more than it hurts high-SES individuals (see Chetty et al. (2022a); Chetty and Jackson (2026)). One can try to improve exposure and friending across SES lines within schools, which could have a large impact, without uprooting communities. This is nuanced, as simply building large schools that house a range of SES does not necessarily lead to connections across class lines. The curriculum has to be designed so that there is the sort of sustained contact and deep interaction across SES lines that foster friendships.

A clear policy lesson is that programs that are entirely financial, without addressing social constraints, will not have long-term impacts. They address symptoms without fully addressing underlying causes (see Jackson (2026) for more discussion). In addition, it is not easy to change exposure, given that people tend to sort geographically and homophily is a powerful force in determining where people choose to live. In Chetty and Jackson (2026) we examine the implications of this. In order to encourage more geographic mobility, which can help provide greater connectedness, one has to overcome the tendency of parents to want to live in communities that are more homogeneously similar to themselves. Simply providing them with financial incentives to move does not encourage them to move to places that are more heterogeneous and provide cross-SES connections. It can also require providing greater training for parents and helping them overcome potentially biased perceptions of what it is like to live in places that encourage more cross-SES connections.

Another policy lesson from taking the network structure seriously is that there are feedback effects, and hence tipping points, where once one has changed enough connections, one can end up with feedbacks in opportunities, norms, behaviors, and outcomes that lead to even larger gains (see discussions of this in Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004); Jackson (2007, 2026); Chetty and Jackson (2026)). This means that spreading policy interventions evenly may be less effective than concentrating them in areas where one can have a big enough impact to induce a sort of social-network multiplier and a discontinuous change in behaviors.

Additionally, because many forces are at work simultaneously, it can be important to have policies that are multidimensional as well (Jackson, 2026). This is especially true as social engineering can be challenging, and so it can be important to provide the many things that are lacking via people's social networks due to a lack of economic connectedness. As an example, simply providing financial assistance for investing in education may not be enough if one also lacks information about how to pursue an education, as well as role models, aspirations, and norms for study and education. Policy interventions can have a weakest-link sort of structure, where one needs a whole set of interventions at once to address all the missing dimensions, and not addressing any particular one of them leads to failure or a much weaker outcome.¹⁰

Understanding the role of networks in determining economic outcomes helps shape policy design and offers new insights into why inequality and immobility have been so resilient. Nonetheless, there is still much that we need to learn about why homophily arises and why it is also so pervasive and resilient. Also, although we have many theories—opportunities, learning, norms, aspirations...—pointing to

¹⁰ See Banerjee et al. (2025) for a field experiment showing that multidimensional policies can be very effective even when no unidimensional policy is.

why friendships should matter, and we have causal evidence that friendships matter, we do not yet have a good understanding of which of the theorized channels are at work. A conjecture is that they all are, which would help account for why friendships impact economic behaviors and outcomes so robustly.

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CURRICULUM VITAE
DE MATTHEW O. JACKSON

Després de llicenciar-se amb la distinció *summa cum laude* en Economia a la Princeton University l'any 1984, Matthew O. Jackson va obtenir un doctorat en Economia a la Stanford Graduate School of Business el 1988.

La seva trajectòria acadèmica va començar a la Kellogg Graduate School of Management de la Northwestern University, al Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa i Ciències de la Decisió (MEDS, per la sigla en anglès) entre 1988 i 1997, departament que va dirigir i en el qual va ocupar càrrecs destacats, com ara la plaça IBM Distinguished Professorship. Posteriorment, va continuar la seva carrera al California Institute of Technology (Caltech), on va ser titular de la Càtedra Edie and Lew Wasserman d'Economia de 1997 a 2006, abans de tornar a la Stanford University, on va ocupar el càrrec de cap del Departament d'Economia de 2021 a 2023 i on és titular de la Càtedra William D. Eberle.

Les primeres investigacions del Dr. Jackson es van centrar en el disseny de mecanismes, la teoria de la implementació i la teoria de subhastes. A partir de finals de la dècada de 1980, i en col·laboració amb Salvador Barberà, destaca la seva recerca sobre la teoria de l'elecció social, els mecanismes de vot i l'economia política.

Tot i això, l'impacte acadèmic més significatiu del Dr. Jackson ha estat en el camp de l'economia de xarxes. És àmpliament considerat el principal artífex de la recerca en aquesta disciplina.

A principis dels anys 2000, el professor Jackson va treballar exhaustivament amb Antoni Calvó Armengol en una sèrie d'articles de recerca sobre l'aplicació de la teoria de l'economia de xarxes en l'estudi dels mercats laborals. En un altre àmbit, després de la crisi financera global de l'any 2008, Jackson va aplicar els coneixements de l'economia de xarxes a les xarxes financeres i al risc sistèmic, així com a les propietats de les cadenes de subministrament i les seves disruptions.

La recerca teòrica del Dr. Jackson ha anat acompanyada d'aplicacions empíriques. En l'àmbit de l'economia del desenvolupament, Jackson ha col·laborat amb Abhijit Banerjee i Esther Duflo, economistes guardonats amb el Premi Nobel, i amb Arun Chandrasekhar per estudiar la difusió dels programes de préstecs a l'Índia rural a través de xarxes socials. També ha col·laborat amb Raj Chetty, entre d'altres, per utilitzar les dades de les xarxes socials per estudiar fins a quin punt les xarxes de connexions entre individus influeixen en la desigualtat i la mobilitat econòmica.

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Ph.D. in Economics from the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1988.

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Full-time appointments:

2008-present, William D. Eberle Professor of Economics, Stanford University.

2006-2008, Professor of Economics, Stanford University.

2002-2006, Edie and Lew Wasserman Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology.

1997-2002, Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology.

1996-1997, IBM Distinguished Professor of Regulatory and Competitive Practices MEDS department (Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences), Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

1995-1996, Mechthild E. Nemmers Distinguished Professor MEDS, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

1993-1994, Professor (MEDS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

1991-1993, Associate Professor (MEDS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

1988-1991, Assistant Professor, (MEDS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

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Visiting Professor: Monash University, Aug-Sept 2025, 2026, 2027.
Chair, Scientific Council: Barcelona School of Economics, 2021-present. Advisory Board: Game Theory Society, 2024-present.

Senior Fellow: SIEPR (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research) 2020-present.

Advisory Board: Santa Fe Institute's Emergent Political Economies Research Network, 2022-present.

External Faculty Member: Santa Fe Institute, 2007-present.

Co-Director: NSF Network Science in Economics Conference Series, 2014-present.

Scientific Council: Barcelona School of Economics, 2007-present.

International Advisory Board: Barcelona Economic Analysis Team, 2017-present.

Governing Board: International Society for Computational Social Science (ISCSS), 2016-present.

Scientific Board: Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, 2009-present.

Scientific Advisory Board: Santa Fe Institute, 2017-2024.

Chair, Section 54 (Economics), National Academy of Sciences 2021-2024. Chair, Department of Economics, Stanford University 2021-2023.

Chair, Scientific Advisory Board: MOVE - Markets, Organizations and Votes in Economics, Barcelona, 2010-2023.

Advisory Board: Center for Research in Microeconomics, University of Cambridge, 2008-2023.

Member: Visiting Committee for IDSS, Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, MIT, 2017-2022.

Member: PNAS Cozzarelli (best paper) prize committee 2017-2021. Chair: American Academy of Arts and Sciences Class III - Section 2 Membership Section Panel, 2018-2021, member 2015-2016.

Chair, Selection Committee: Calvó-Armengol International Prize in Economics, 2010-2019.

Director Graduate Studies: Department of Economics, Stanford University, 2014-2019.

Senior Fellow: CIFAR (Canadian Institute for Advanced Research), 2010-2020.

Fellowship Nominating Committee: Society for Advancement of Economic Theory, 2012-2020.

National Academy of Sciences, social sciences temporary nominating group, 2018-2019.

National Academy of Sciences, social sciences nominating committee, 2017-2019.

Executive Committee Member: Econometric Society, 2010-2012, 2014-2016.

Council member: Econometric Society, 2006-2012, 2014-2016.

Program Reviews/Visiting Committees: Northwestern University, MEDS, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, MEDS, 2015, Brown University Department of Economics, 2011, University of Pennsylvania Department of Economics, 2009, Columbia University Department of Economics, 2008, Northwestern University Engineering School 1997.

Council member (and founding member): Society for Social Choice and Welfare, 1992-1997, 2000-2005, 2008-2013.

Selection Committee: Nakahara Prize, 2008-2012.

Vice Chair: Economics Department, Stanford University, 2008-2011.
Director: SITE (Stanford Institute in Theoretical Economics), 2006-2010.
Director: CEME-NSF Decentralization Conference Series, 2002-2010.

Fellows Nominating Committee: Econometric Society, 2007, 2008 (Chair), 2009.

Council member (and charter member): Game Theory Society, 2004-2009.

Director: SISL (Social and Information Sciences Laboratory, Caltech), 2003-2005.

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Editorial Board *PNAS*, 2020-2021.

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Associate editor *Not a Journal of Economics* (web-based review) 2005-2015.

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John von Neumann Award, Rajk László College, 2015. Member of the National Academy of Sciences, elected 2015. Doctorat Honoris Causa, Aix-Marseille Université, 2013.

Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching in Humanities and Sciences, Stanford, 2013.

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Arrow Prize for Senior Economists, BEPress, 2007.

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State Farm Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, 1987-1988. National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1984-87.

Wolf Balleisen Memorial Prize (Undergraduate Thesis in Economics), Princeton University, 1984.

Class of 1916 Cup, (Student-Athlete), Princeton University, 1984.

Named lectures:

Veblen-Clark Lecture, Carleton College, Nov. 2025. Frank Hahn Lecture, University of Siena, May 2025.

James Buchanan and Vernon Smith seminar, George Mason University, Nov. 2024.

National School of Development 30th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, Peking University, Aug. 2024.

Hicks Lecture, SAET Annual Meetings, Santiago Chile, Jan. 2024.
Clement and Carrie Chair lecture, Tamkang University, Dec. 2023.

J. Mark Sowers Distinguished Lecture, Virginia Tech, Mar. 2023.
IEPR Distinguished Lecture, USC, Jan. 2023.

Slater Family Prize Lecture, Technion, Nov. 2022.

Robert Rosenthal Memorial Lecture, Boston University, Apr. 2022.
Marburg Memorial Lecture, Marquette University, Oct. 2021.

Colin Clark Lecture, Queensland University, Feb. 2021. Reinhard Selten Lecture, Universität Bonn, Oct. 2019. Walras-Pareto Lecture, HEC Lausanne, Oct. 2019.

Klein Lecture, University of Pennsylvania, Sept. 2019. Hotelling Lectures, Econometric Society, Nov. 2016.

Arrow Lecture, Hebrew University, July 2016.

Seymour E. and Ruth B. Harris Lecture, Harvard University, Oct. 2015. Seelye Fellow Public Lecture, University of Auckland, Dec. 2014.

Cowles Lecture, North American Econometric Society Annual Meetings, June 2013.

Hahn Lecture, Royal Economic Society, April 2013.

Arrow Lecture, International Meetings of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Delhi, Aug. 2012.

Tinbergen Lectures, Tinbergen Institute, June 2012.

Lansdowne Lecture, University of Victoria, March 2012. Pazner Lecture, Tel Aviv University, Dec. 2011

Steine Lecture, Vanderbilt University, Nov. 2011.

Lionel W. McKenzie Lecture, University of Rochester, March 2011. Richard T. Ely Distinguished Lectures, Johns Hopkins University, 2010. Fisher-Schultz Lecture, Econometric Society, Aug. 2007.

Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lecture, Northwestern University, April 2007. Pareto Lecture, ASSET Meetings, Nov. 2002.

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Books and other publications:

Book: Matthew O. Jackson, *The Human Network*, Pantheon Books - Random House, NY; also: Atlantic Books, UK; CITICPress, China; Corpus, Russia; Bada Publishing, Korea; Hayakawa Publishing, Japan; Recorded Books, Audio; 2019.

Book: Matthew O. Jackson, *Social and Economic Networks*, Princeton University Press, 2008, 2010.

Book Edited: Matthew O. Jackson and Yves Zenou, Book Edited: *Economic Analyses of Social Networks*, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.

Book Edited: Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Matthew O. Jackson, *Handbook of Social Economics*, co-edited North Holland, 2011.

Book Edited: Matthew O. Jackson and Andrew McLennan, *A Volume in Honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein: Foundations in Microeconomic Theory*, Springer, Heidelberg 2008.

Book Edited: Bhaskar Dutta and Matthew O. Jackson, *Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation*, Springer, Heidelberg 2003.

Special Issue Edited: Matthew O. Jackson and Hugo Sonnenschein, *Journal of the Spanish Economic Association: A special issue in honor of Salvador Barbera*, 2011.

Special Issue Edited: Matthew O. Jackson and Ehud Lehrer, *Games and Economic Behavior: A special issue in honor of Ehud Kalai*, Sept. 2010.

Special Issue Edited: Matthew O. Jackson and Xavier Vives, *Journal of the European Economic Association: A special issue in memory of Antoni Calvo-Armengol*, Jan. 2010.

Working papers:

Raj Chetty, Matthew O. Jackson, “A Theory of the Formation of Social Capital and Economic Mobility,” September 2026.

Raj Chetty, Matthew O. Jackson, Drew Johnston, Theresa Kuchler, Johannes Stroebel, Mike Bailey, “The Causal Effects of Peer Exposure vs. Friendship on Economic Mobility,” September 2026.

Matthew O. Jackson, Shahir Safi, Konstantin Sonin, “Stable Governments and Coups in Political Networks,” September 2026.

Matthew O. Jackson, Benjamin S. Manning, Yutong Xie, Walter Yuan, Qiaozhu Mei, “Modeling Human Behavior with Type Vectors Using AI,” September 2026.

Gary Charness, Francesco Feri, Matthew O. Jackson, Miguel A. Melendez-Jimenez, Matthias Sutter, “The friendship paradox: Causal evidence of its behavioral consequences,” August 2026.

Matthew O. Jackson, Zafer Kanik, “The Economic Benefits and Costs of AI and Policies to Mitigate AI’s Impact on Inequality,” August 2026.

Eleanor A. Power, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Samuel Bowles, Matthew O. Jackson, Jeremy Koster, Daniel Redhead, Tom Rutter, Sahana Subramanyam, Justin Weltz, and the ENDOW team, “Social Network Structure, Wealth, and Wealth Inequality Across Cultures,” August 2026.

Jin Huang, Yutong Xie, Wanli Song, Xingjian Zhang, Walter Yuan, Matthew O. Jackson, Qiaozhu Mei, “BehaviorBench: Benchmarking Foundation Models for Behavioral Science Tasks,” June 2026.

Promit K. Chaudhuri, Matthew O. Jackson, Sudipta Sarangi, Hector Tzavellas, “Network Beliefs and Behavior with Peer Effects,” revised: May 2026.

Matthew L. Elliott, Matthew O. Jackson “Supply Chain Disruptions, the Structure of Production Networks, and the Impact of Globalization,” revised: July 2026.

Yunus C. Aybas, Matthew O. Jackson, “Social Learning with Endogenous Information and the Countervailing Effects of Homophily,” revised: June 2026.

Jon Bendor, Lukas Bolte, Nicole Immorlica, Matthew O. Jackson “Interaction across multiple games: cooperation, corruption, and organizational design,” revised February 2026.

Hans Gersbach, Matthew O. Jackson, Oriol Tejada “The Optimal Length of Political Terms,” revised: January 2026.

Matthew O. Jackson, Qiaozhu Mei, Stephanie Wang, Yutong Xie, Walter Yuan, Seth Benzell, Erik Brynjolfsson, Colin F. Camerer, James Evans, Brian Jabarian, Jon Kleinberg, Juanjuan Meng, Sendhil Mullainathan, Asu Ozdaglar, Thomas Pfeiffer, Moshe Tennenholtz, Robb Willer, Diyi Yang, Teng Ye, “AI Behavioral Science,” revised May 2026.

Matthew O. Jackson, Suraj Malladi, David McAdams “The Fragility of Social Learning with Noisy Messages,” revised: August 2026.

Arun G. Chandrasekhar, Matthew O. Jackson, Tyler H. McCormick, Vydhourie Thiyageswaran, “General Covariance-Based Conditions for Central Limit Theorems with Dependent Triangular Arrays,” revised: June 2025.

Matthew O. Jackson, Stephen Nei, Erik Snowberg, Leeat Yariv “The Dynamics of Networks and Homophily,” revised: September 2026.

Yutong Xie, Zhuoheng Li, Xiyuan Wang, Yijun Pan, Qijia Liu, Xingzhi Cui, Kuang-Yu Lo, Ruoyi Gao, Xingjian Zhang, Jin Huang, Walter Yuan, Matthew O. Jackson, Qiaozhu Mei, “Be.FM: Open Foundation Models for Human Behavior,” revised: July 2025.

Teng Ye, Hanson Yan, Xuhuan Huang, Connor Grogan, Walter Yuan, Matthew O. Jackson, Qiaozhu Mei, “Content Quality vs. Attention Allocation: An LLM-Based Case Study in a Peer-to-Peer Mental Health Network,” November 2024.

Matthew O. Jackson, Zhongjian Lin, Ning Neil Yu “Adjusting for Peer-Influence in Propensity Scoring When Estimating Treatment Effects,” revised: February 2026.

Matthew O. Jackson and Leeat Yariv, “The Non-Existence of Representative Agents,” revised: January 2024.

Matthew O. Jackson, Stephen Nei, Erik Snowberg, Leeat Yariv “A Hedonic Model of the Dynamic Formation of Networks and Homophily,” August 2024.

Matthew O. Jackson and Zafer Kanik, “How Automation that Substitutes for Labor Affects Production Networks, Growth, and Income Inequality,” July 2020.

Nicole Immorlica, Matthew O. Jackson, Glen Weyl, “Verifying Identity as a Social Intersection,” revised: May 2019.

Matthew O. Jackson and Pietro Tebaldi, “A Forest Fire Theory of the Duration of a Boom and the Size of a Subsequent Bust,” revised: February 2019.

Matthew O. Jackson, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Yiqing Xing, “A Theory of Efficient Negotiations,” revised: March 2016.

Arun Chandrasekhar and Matthew O. Jackson, “Tractable and Consistent Random Graph Models,” revised: June 2014.

Matthew O. Jackson, “Matching, Auctions, and Market Design,” April 2013.

Matthew O. Jackson, “Social Structure, Segregation, and Economic Behavior,” presented as the *Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture 2007*.

Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, and Asher Wolinsky, “Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay Auctions and Wars of Attrition,” November 2006.

John Duggan and Matthew O. Jackson, “Mixed Strategy Equilibrium and Deep Covering in Electoral Competition Games,” May 2004, revised December 2006.

Grants:

National Science Foundation Grant (Collaborative Research: SBE-UKRI: A Cross-Cultural Study of Variability in Economic Prosperity using Machine-Learning and Statistical Analysis, FAIN-2448791), with Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Sam Bowles, Elly Power, John Ziker, 2026-2028.

National Science Foundation Grant (Collaborative Research: The effect of social networks on inequality: A longitudinal cross-cultural investigation, IBSS-L-1743019), with Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Sam Bowles, Jeremy Koster, Elly Power, 2022-2026.

National Science Foundation Grant (Theoretical and Empirical Investigations of the Dynamics of Homophily and its Impact on Students' Achievement, Decisions, and Well-Being SES-2018554), 2020-2024.

National Science Foundation Grant (Network Science in Economics Conference Series SES-1757223), with Arun Chandrasekar, Ben Golub, and Sudipta Sarangi, 2019-2024.

National Science Foundation Grant (Collaborative Research: The effect of social networks on inequality: A longitudinal cross-cultural investigation, IBSS-L-1743019), with Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Sam Bowles, Simon DeDeo, Paul Hooper, Jeremy Koster, 2017-2021.

National Science Foundation Grant (Collaborative Research: Multiplexing: Theories and Tests of Interactions Between Types of Relationships SES-1629446), with Arun Chandrasekar and Ben Golub 2016-2019.

ONR BAA - MURI Grant (Evolution of Cultural Norms and Dynamics of Socio-political Change), team: Ali Jadbabaie and Michael Kearns (Penn.), D. Acemoglu, F. Christia, M. Dahleh, and A. Ozdaglar (MIT), L. Blume and J. Kleinberg (Cornell), M.O. Jackson and J. Leskovec (Stanford), J. Shamma (Georgia IT), 2012-2017.

National Science Foundation Grant (Collaborative Research: Social Networks and Microfinance SES-1155302), 2012-2016.

AFOSR and DARPA Grant (FA9550-12-01-0411 MEGA: Modern Graph Analysis for Dynamic Networks), team: Ashish Goel, John Heidemann, Matthew O. Jackson, Ramesh Johari, Jure Leskovec, Andrea Montanari, Amin Saberi, 2012-2016.

National Science Foundation Grant (Studies of Social Structure and Economic Behavior SES-0961481), 2010-2013.

National Science Foundation Grant (Social Networks and the Diffusion of Microfinance SES-0752735, team: Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Matthew Jackson), 2008-2009.

National Science Foundation Grant (Studies of Social Structure and Economic Behavior SES-0647867), 2007-2010.

National Science Foundation Grant (Renewal: Endogenous Mechanisms SES-0316493), 2003-2006.

Commission for Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange between the United States of America and Spain, with Salvador Barbera and CODE, grant 2000-2001.

Commission for Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange between the United States of America and Spain, with Salvador Barbera and CODE, grant 1998-1999.

National Science Foundation Grant (Endogenous Mechanisms SES-9986190) 1999-2003.

National Science Foundation Grant (Recurring Games and the Design of Markets SBR-9507912), 1995-1999.

National Science Foundation Grant (Workshop in Economic Theory, with Larry Jones, Steven Matthews, Roger Myerson, and Nancy Stokey), 1996-1998.

National Science Foundation Grant (Price Behavior in Economies with Asymmetric Information SBR-9223338), 1992-1995.

National Science Foundation Grant (Workshop in Economic Theory, with Larry Jones, Steven Matthews, and Nancy Stokey), 1993-1995.

National Science Foundation Grant (Issues in Implementation Theory SES-8921409), 1989-1992.

Keynote/ Plenary lectures:

Keynote, IMEBESS Prague July 2026. Plenary, VI BEL Sao Paolo May 2026.

State of the Art Lecture CEA Vancouver May 2026.

Plenary, Asian Meetings of the Econometric Society, NYU Abu Dhabi, Jan. 2026.

Keynote, 51st Conference on the Mathematics of Operations Research, LNMB Netherlands, Jan. 2026.

Plenary, Workshop on Social Choice, Game Theory, and Mechanism Design, University of Glasgow, June 2025.

Keynote, BSE Summer Forum on Networks, June 2024.

Keynote, Workshop on Networks and Development, University of Naples May 2024.

Keynote, Biennial Conference of the Hong Kong Economic Association, Dec. 2023.

Keynote, Asian Meetings of the Econometric Society, Singapore July 2023.

Keynote, Economic Science Association World Meeting, Lyon July 2023. Keynote, International Workshop on Experimental Economics, Xiamen University Dec. 2022.

Keynote, Applied Economics Workshop, Online Dec. 2022.

Keynote, Networks, Behaviour and Strategies in Early Financial Markets, Stockholm Oct. 2022.

Presidential Address, Game Theory Society World Congress, Budapest July 2021.

Keynote, Chinese Economist Society Meeting, June 2021.

Keynote, Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Marseille June 2021.
Annual Lecture, Complexity Lab in Economics, June 2021.

Keynote Lecture, Inverse Generative Social Science Workshop, June 2021. Keynote Lecture, Virtual Workshop on Economics of Epidemiology, Leicester May 2021.

Plenary Lecture, Annual International Conference of the Complex Systems Society, Dec. 2020.

Plenary Lecture, Lancaster Game Theory conference Nov 2020.

Keynote Lecture, 3rd Conference on Financial Stability, Mexico City, Nov. 2019.

Inaugural Lecture PhD Program in Economics and Management, University of Padova, Sept. 2019.

Keynote Lecture, Summer School on Economic Networks, Oxford, June 2019.

Keynote Lecture, Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Xiaomen China, June 2019.

Keynote Lecture, Coalition Theory Network, Aix-Marseille, May 2019. Fed Reserve Conference on Financial Networks, Mar. 2019.

American Finance Association Lecture, ASSA meetings Jan. 2019. Keynote Lecture, LACEA-LAMES - Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association and Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Ecuador Nov. 2018.

Keynote Lecture, International Conference on Economic Theory and Applications, Chengdu, July 2018.

Keynote Lecture, 4th international Conference on Computational Social Science (IC2S2), Evanston, July 2018.

Keynote Lecture, INAS, International Network of Analytical Sociology Meetings, June 2018.

Keynote Lecture, New Economic School 25th Anniversary Conference, Moscow, Dec 2017.

Keynote Lecture, 21st Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional and Organizational Economics (SIOE), New York, June 2017.

Plenary Lecture, International Conference on Game Theory and Management, St. Petersburg Russia, June 2017.

Keynote Lecture, Social Network and Information Conference, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, Apr. 2017

50th Anniversary Lecture Series, HSS Caltech Oct. 2016. Plenary Lecture, Texas Economic Theory Camp, Rice Oct. 2016. Keynote Lecture, ESOBE Conference, Gerzensee, October 2015.

Plenary Lecture, The 26th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, July 2015.

Keynote Lecture, International Conference on Computational Social Science, Helsinki, Jun. 2015.

Keynote Lecture, UC Davis Institute for Social Science Inaugural Conference: Social Networks in Decision Making, May 2015.

Keynote Lecture, Centre for Mathematical Social Sciences Summer Workshop, University of Auckland, Dec. 2014.

Invited Lecture, 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, Oct. 2014.

Keynote Lecture, EC Conference, June 2014.

Plenary Lecture, Coalition Theory Network, Brussels, January 2014.
Plenary Lecture, Central American Econometric Society Annual Meetings, Mexico City, November 2013.

Inaugural Lecture, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresariales, October 2013.

Plenary Lecture, Asian Econometric Society Annual Meetings, Singapore, August 2013.

Keynote Lecture, Network Science Meetings, June 2013.

Plenary Lecture, CAEC (Cambridge Area Economics and Computation Day), MIT, April 2013.

Keynote Lecture, Econometric Society Australasian Meetings, Adelaide, July 2011.

Plenary Lecture, Workshop on Information in Networks (WIN), NYU Stern, Sept. 2011.

Plenary Lecture, SING7 Meeting on Game Theory, Paris, July 2011.

Plenary Lecture, Association for Public Economic Theory Annual Conference, Indiana University, June 2011.

Plenary Lecture, The 2nd Annual UECE Meetings on Game Theory and Applications, Lisbon, November 2010.

Plenary Lecture, Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice, Dusseldorf, September 2010.

Plenary Lecture, Inaugural Meeting of the Chinese Game Theory Society, Beijing, August 2010.

Plenary Lecture, Political Networks Conference, Duke University, May 2010.

Plenary Lecture, Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions, Newport Beach, May 2010.

Plenary Lecture, Doctoral Conference of ADRES 2010 - Lyon 2010
Plenary Lecture, Complex '09 - 9th annual Asia Pacific Complex Systems Conference, Tokyo, Nov. 2009.

Plenary Lecture, Workshop on Information in Networks (WIN), NYU Stern, Sept. 2009.

Plenary Lecture, SED 2009, Society for Economic Design Annual Meeting, Istanbul, July 2009.

Workshop Lectures, NETSCI09, Venice, June 2009.

Plenary Lecture: DIME International Conference on the Formation and the Evolution of Social and Economic Networks, Paris, June 2009.

NSF Uncertainty Workshop, USC, April 2009.

Plenary Lecture, Coalition Theory Network Workshop, University of Maastricht, January 2009.

Plenary Lecture, Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), Shanghai, December 2008.

Plenary Lecture, Brazilian Econometric Society Meetings, Recife, December 2007.

Plenary Lecture, Fifth International Conference on Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice (LGS 5), Bilbao, June 2007.

Plenary Lecture, ADRES International Conference on Networks of Innovation, St. Étienne, Sept. 2006.

Plenary Lecture, WEHIA 1st International Conference on Economic Sciences with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, Bologna, June 2006.
Invited Speaker: 9th World Congress of Econometric society, London August 2005.

Plenary Lecture, Stony Brook International Festival on Game Theory, Stony Brook, July 2005.

Plenary Lecture, Public Economic Theory Annual Meetings, Marseille June 2005.

Semi-Plenary: Games 2004 - Second World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Marseille, July 2004.

Prize Lecture - 6 th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Pasadena, July 2002.

Semi-Plenary: Games 2000 - First World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Bilbao July 2000.

UCSD Microeconomic Theory Distinguished Lecturer, March 2011.

Courses taught:

Decision Making Under Uncertainty (Ph.D.), Economics of Exchange and Market Micro-Structure (Ph.D.), Formal Theories in Political Science (Undergrad.), Theory of Value (Undergrad.), Foundations of Political Economy (Ph.D.), Game Theory I and II (MOOC, Undergrad. and Grad.), Microeconomics (Ph.D., MBA, Exec., Undergrad.), Networks and Human Behavior (Undergrad), Political Economy I and II (Ph.D.), Probability Theory (Ph.D.), Social and Economic Networks (MOOC, Ph.D.), Statistics (MBA), Pricing (MBA).

Principal Advisor:

Luiz Carpizo (current, co-advisor with Kyle Bagwell), Ben Davies (current, co-advisor with Arun Chandrasekhar), Tom Rutter (current), Sumhith Veda Aradhyula (current), Michael Crystal (2026, co-advisor with Paul Milgrom), Anirudh Sankar (2026, co-advisor with Arun Chandrasekhar), Roberto Saitto (2025, co-advisor with Paul Milgrom), Evan Storms (2025), Yunus C. Aybas (2024, co-advisor with Steven Callander), Agathe Pernoud (2023), Negar Matoorian (2023, co-advisor with Andy Skrzypacz), Akhil Vohra (2021, co-advisor with Al Roth), Eduardo Laguna-Muggenberg (2020), Vivian Yu Zheng

(2019), Zafer Kanik (2018 Boston College, co-advisor with Susanto Basu), Isa Chaves (2018, co-advisor with Andy Skrzypacz), Stephen Nei (2017), Chaojun Wang (2017, co-advisor with Darrell Duffie), Yiqing Xing (2016), Matt Leduc (2014, co-advisor with Ramesh Johari), Xu Tan (2013), Matthew Elliott (2011), Benjamin Golub (2011), Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer (2011), Manuj Garg (2010), Carlos Lever (2010), Yee Wai Chong (2008), Laurent Mathevet (2008, co-advisor with Federico Echenique), Jon Eguia (2007, co-advisor with Tom Palfrey), Jernej Copic (2006), Brian Rogers (2006, co-advisor with Tom Palfrey), Kathy Zeiler (2003), Ben Klemens (2003), Valentina Bali (2001).

ACORD 93/2025, d'11 de desembre, del Consell de Govern

Vistos la petició formulada pel Deganat de la Facultat d'Economia i Empresa i l'acord del Consell de Centre de la Facultat, amb data 23 d'octubre de 2025, pels quals se sol·licita al Consell de Govern el nomenament del doctor Matthew O. Jackson com a doctor *honoris causa* de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, a proposta del Deganat de la Facultat.

Atès que, tant del currículum del candidat com de la documentació referent als seus mèrits i de les circumstàncies que concorren, queda acreditat que la seva activitat en el camp de la docència i de la recerca el fan mereixedor d'obtenir la distinció de doctor *honoris causa* de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Atès que la normativa que regula el procediment per a l'atorgament del títol de doctor *honoris causa*, aprovada pel Consell de Govern en data 26 de maig de 2004, en el seu article 5.2 estableix que el Consell de Govern podrà atorgar un nomenament cada dos anys a la Facultat de Ciències, a la Facultat de Filosofia i Lletres i a la Facultat de Medicina, i un nomenament cada quatre anys a cadascun dels centres restants.

Atès que la proposta de la Facultat d'Economia i Empresa compleix els requisits exigits a la normativa abans esmentada.

S'ACORDA:

PRIMER. Nomenar el doctor Matthew O. Jackson doctor *honoris causa* de la UAB.

SEGON. Encarregar a la secretària general l'execució i el seguiment d'aquest acord.

TERCER. Comunicar el present acord al Deganat de la Facultat d'Economia i Empresa.

